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Benumbed

by Carl E. Schneider

!

originally intended to write a column on tort liability and research
ethics, and I still' plan to do so. But
this column is a cri de coeur as I finish
another semester teaching law and
bioethics. This year, I asked with growing frequency, urgency, and exasperation, "Must law's reverence for autonomy squeeze out the impulse to kindness?
Where is the beneficence in bioethics?"
These questions assail me every term.
Why?
Consider Steele v. Hamilton County
Community Mental Health Board. 1 Mr.
Steele was involuntarily "hospitalized
after his family reported that he was 'seeing things and trying to fight imaginary
foes."' Concluding that Mr. Steele was
paranoid schizophrenic, the hospital
sought judicial permission to give Mr.
Steele antipsychotic drugs without his
"informed consent." Eventually the case
reached the Ohio Supreme Court. It
began its analysis by intoning a hymn to
"the right to refuse medical treatment,"
which it called "a fundamental right in
our country, where personal security,
bodily integrity, and autonomy are cherished liberties." The court concluded
that the state could not administer the
drugs unless it showed by "clear and
convincing evidence" that (1) a patient
"lacks the capacity to give or withhold
informed consent," (2) "the benefits of
the antipsychotic medication outweigh
the side effects," and (3) "there is no less
intrusive treatment . . . as effective in
treating the illness." Piling Ossa on Pelion, the court imposed elaborate proce-
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dural requirements for issuing and
maintaining such a judicial order.
Perhaps this is the right result. It is
not, as opinions in this area go, extreme,
which is one reason I've selected it to
discuss. Certainly the history of civil
commitment and hospitalization of the
mentally ill has sometimes been ugly.
Surely infringing autonomy can be cruel
in its own ways, as Jay Katz's famous
story of Iphigenia reminds us. 2 But the
court's opinion in Steele does not justifY
its holding, and the omissions in it make
it heartless. Painfully absent is any sense
that poor Mr. Steele lay bound on the
rack of a disease that was destroying his
life and devastating his family and that
ameliorating this wretchedness was even
desirable. The court nodded briefly to
"the state's parens patriae power," but its
attention and concern went not to the
savagery of the disease, but to the menace of the state. The court's anxiety was
overwhelmingly that "[t]his type of intrusion clearly compromises one's liberty
interests in personal security, bodily integrity, and autonomy." When the court
mentioned treatment, it lingered lovingly on the side effects of antipsychotic
drugs, since " [t] he seriousness of the
possible side effects of these types of
drugs cannot be overstated." The court
went on to overstate that seriousness,
not least because its information was indolently drawn from legal, not medical,
sources and out of date.
Hence the court strewed barriers between Mr. Steele and treatment. It repeatedly imposed the highest civil stan-

dard of proof-"clear and convincing
evidence" rather than "a preponderance
of the evidence"-and it devised procedures that were forbiddingly burdensome. If all this inspired better decisions
about treatment, it might be justifiable.
But the court never bothered to assess
the effects of its requirements, and in
other contexts we would call them "bureaucratic red tape." The court seemed
more influenced by One Flew Over the
Cuckoo's Nest than evidence about paranoid schizophrenia, commitment proceedings, or due process.
Yet the court's apparent indifference
to Mr. Steele's illness was not forced
upon it. The law of procedural due
process, while it interprets an express
constitutional text, is in all else a judicial
creation. And the law of substantive due
process (the wellspring of "the right to
refuse medical treatment") is fons et origo
judicially created. What is more, why
was the right attributed to Mr. Steele the
right to refuse treatment (and not, say, a
right to have treatment)? Did he choose
this argument? If he was seeing things
and fighting imaginary foes, how lucidly, how autonomously, was he thinking?
If he did not assert the right to refuse
treatment, who chose for him, and why
did the court accept the choice so uncritically? More broadly, what can be
said of a legal system that develops so
zealously, so sanctimoniously, the right
to refuse medical treatment while ignoring the tens of millions who cannot get
it?
I was not heartened when I turned
from the court's opinion to my class's reaction. Law is taught through "casebooks" that comprise cases, statutes, administrative regulations, commentary,
text, and questions. My co-author wrote
the section of our casebook that considers decisions for incompetent patients
and thus Steele. She realized that many
students would know little about mental
illness and wanted to give them some
sense of what a paranoid schizophrenic
must endure. She did a masterly job, not
just through medical and social data,
but also through excerpts from a paranoid schizophrenic's moving account of
his torment in the throes of the disease
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and his partial but blessed release when
he was finally treated.
Nevertheless, the class's first and virtually only reaction to Steele was that the
opinion was dangerously tolerant of the
state's invasion of Mr. Steele's rights:
Everyone has a right to autonomy and
therefore to refuse medical treatment,
and schizophrenics do not lose their
rights just because they are ill. Mr. Steele
and his family might be suffering, but
forced medication would be an intolerable step down the slippery slope toward
the end of personal autonomy. End of
Story.
If I thought my students were particularly callous, I would not be disturbed
by their reaction to Steele. But they are, if
anything, exceptionally decent. I know
quite a lot about law students: I was one,
I teach them, and I am writing a book
about how our graduates have made decisions about their careers. I always
emerge from my interviews with an enlivened respect for our students and for
their seriousness and goodness. The interviews make me glad to be their
teacher.
So what leads good people like my
students (and, presumably, the judges in
Steele) to respond so indifferently to the
misery of Mr. Steele and his family?
That is too big a question for so small a
space. But law has its own imperatives.
Law's "idioms rule us in ways we do not
always grasp or desire, and they have
limits growing out of the ends for which
they were created." 3 Law is about minimums, not maximums; rules, not compassion; deterring wrong, not inspiring
right. It is driven by distrust. It can be
satisfied by forms, by outward signs
without inward grace. All this is often
unavoidable. But then law should proceed-as it did not in Steele-with delicacy, discretion, prudence, modesty, and
insight into and sympathy for the lives
of those it traps.
In particular, the law's moral clumsiness should make us cautious when legal
reasoning colonizes other institutions
and should make us zealous to preserve
the extra-legal virtues that those institutions should nurture. It is easy to understand the resort to law: It always looks
like the cheapest way to change behav10

ior. And the grand principles that we
hope animate law are so near to our
hearts and so embedded in our culture
that we carelessly embrace the legal rules,
forms, and procedures that attend them.
But when legal thinking infiltrates social
behavior, the bad in legal reasoning drives out the good in social life. The legal
principle of autonomy is so "greedy" a
principle, a principle so determined to
extend itself to its limits, that it crowds
out what patients themselves may think
are more important matters, matters of
decency and compassion unmoored to
ideas about autonomy. And so homely
virtues like solicitude and kindness get
lost in the struggle.
But law should not shoulder all the
blame; "bioethics" shares these faults
without the law's excuse of special imperatives. As Renee Fox gently puts it,
even the "benefiting of others advocated
in bioethical thought is circumscribed
by respectful deference to individual
rights, interests, and autonomy; and
minimizing the harm done to individuals is more greatly accentuated than the
maximization of either personal or collective good."4
Consider an example at the intersection of law and bioethics. I have been
reading articles on "advance care planning" by eminent bioethicists and doctors. Often I can barely tell that they are
instructing physicians on how to help
human beings face decay and death. The
articles march straight to the point-patients have a right to make medical decisions, doctors should transcribe their
wishes in legally binding form. Hardly a
word about the sustenance and comfort-physical, moral, emotional-that
dying people might crave. Hardly a hint
that sympathy, understanding, reassurance, and support might be as dear to
patients as legal rights. No sense that patients' troubles can be eased by costless
kindness, by the simple empathy-or
even good manners-that would make
stories like Reynolds Price's inconceivable: "The presiding radiation oncologist had begun our first meeting by
telling me, with all the visible concern of
a steel cheese-grater, that my tumor was
of a size that was likely unprecedented in
the annals of Duke Hospital." 5 And

what is gained when the law's forms so
overwhelm the doctor's thoughts? Too
often, too little. For example, evidence
now proliferates that the law's gift to the
dying-the living will-rarely serves its
intended purpose. 6
Law speaks of "balancing" individual
rights and state interests. Bioethics
speaks of serving both autonomy and
beneficence. These are impoverished endeavors at best. But if law and bioethics
could at least treat these pairs of concerns with the even-handedness their
formulas seem to imply, they might
achieve a richer morality and a wiser policy. From the start, however, "individual
rights" and "autonomy" exude the odor
of sanctity, while "state interests" and
"beneficence" trail the stench of paternalism, even tyranny.
So as I prepared for class by reviewing
the cases and statutes on law at the end
of life and reading articles on planning
for death, I could not repress the memory of one visit to a hospital palliative care
unit. A patient had arrived from another
hospital. He had only hours to live, and
he was in apparently untreated pain. He
had tried to tear out his IV, and blood
smeared his sheets. He had writhed to
find a painless position, and his gown
hardly covered his nakedness. As he lay
dying he cried out, "Don't let your children die like this in pain. Don't let your
children die like this in pain."
1. 736 NE2d 10 (Ohio 2000).
2. ] . Katz, The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient (The Free Press, 1984).
3. I suggest some of the ways in "Bioethics in
the Language of the Law," HCR 24, no. 4
(1994), 16.
4. R.C. Fox, The Evolution of American
Bioethics: A Sociological Perspective, in George
Weisz, Social Science Perspectives on Medical
Ethics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1990), 206-207.]
5. R. Price, A Whole New Life (New York:
Atheneum, 1994), 40-41.
6. A Fagerlin and C.E. Schneider, "Enough:
The Failure of the Living Will," HCR, forthcoming.
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